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Casenote
License to Oppress: The Aftermath of
Bowers v. Hardwick' is Still Felt Today:
Shahar v. Bowers2
I. Introduction
Homosexual rights claims have reached the courts through
alleged constitutional violations of the right to Due Process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 3 to Equal Protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 to free speech under
the First Amendment, 5 to association,6 and to privacy. 7 Since
the Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which held
that state laws criminalizing consensual sodomy are constitu-
tional, gay litigants asserting civil rights violations have strug-
gled against the inference that is often made from their
homosexual status to illegal sexual conduct.8 Courts have used
the holding in Bowers to deny homosexual rights based on this
inference. 9
In 1997, in Shahar v. Bowers,10 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that Plaintiff Robin Shahar was right-
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. 114 F.3d 1097 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no
constitutionally protected right to engage in consensual sodomy).
4. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (striking down a provision
of an amendment to Colorado's state constitution which prohibited any protection
of homosexuals as a class).
5. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (striking
down military exclusion on the basis of homosexual status).
6. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 186.
9. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
10. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
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fully terminated from her employment with the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office in Georgia due to her 'marriage' to another
woman." Shahar brought an action alleging violations of her
rights to freedom of association, to the free exercise of her reli-
gion, and to equal protection and substantive due process. 12
However, the court failed to opine regarding the constitutional
violations alleged by Shahar because it found that even if she
had the rights which she claimed, she was not entitled to any
relief.13 Instead, the court assumed arguendo that Shahar had
the constitutional rights which she claimed and employed a bal-
ancing test to consider the respective rights of the Attorney
General as a government employer and of Shahar.' 4 Ulti-
mately, the court found that the Attorney General's interests as
a government employer outweighed Shahar's.' 5
Part II explores constitutionally protected intimate and ex-
pressive associations. The naming, constitutional origin and
Supreme Court definition of intimate association are given par-
ticular emphasis. Two Supreme Court cases of critical impor-
tance to homosexual rights litigation, Bowers v. Hardwick 6 and
Romer v. Evans, 7 are analyzed and juxtaposed. Part II also ex-
plores the treatment of homosexual rights cases in lower courts,
including those involving gays in the military and same-sex
marriages. Lastly, Part II discusses the balancing test which is
employed by courts when a government-employer infringes
upon a constitutional right of one of its employees.' 8
Part III discusses the decisional history of the Shahar case,
including a detailed analysis of the four dissenting opinions
written when the Court of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit sat
en banc.' 9 This en banc hearing both vacated the panel decision
which found for Shahar on her intimate association claim, and
affirmed the district court opinion which held that the Attorney
11. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1111.
12. See id. at 1101.
13. See id. at 1099.
14. See id. at 1103 (citing Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
15. See id. at 1111.
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
18. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
19. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1118.
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General's interests as a government-employer outweighed
Shahar's constitutional interests.20
Finally, Part IV proposes that the Supreme Court, through
its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, has established a frame-
work within which lower courts can infer illegal sexual conduct
from homosexual status and thus perpetuate the denial of con-
stitutional rights to homosexuals. 21 This framework is con-
structed as if the law made being homosexual a criminal offense
and has created an environment in which silence about self-
identity is encouraged. A detailed analysis is presented to illus-
trate that Shahar's lesbian relationship clearly fits into the
Supreme Court's definition of intimate association, and there-
fore should have been given great weight in the balancing anal-
ysis done by the Shahar court.22 Part IV also discusses the
similarities between the State's reliance on 'tradition' and pub-
lic perception in Shahar23 and the State's reasoning in Loving v.
Virginia,24 where Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute was
struck down as unconstitutional. 25 Part IV further asserts that
the dissenting justices in Shahar were correct in finding that
Shahar's constitutionally protected intimate association out-
weighs any reasonable interests of the Attorney General as a
state employer.
II. Background
A. Constitutionally Protected Associations: Expressive and
Intimate
Associational rights have been viewed by the Supreme
Court on a continuum from the least protected form of associa-
tion in commercial activities to the most protected forms of as-
sociation to engage in political or religious speech, or for highly
personal, 'intimate' relationships. 26 The right to "association" in
general, although not explicitly enumerated in the First
20. See id. at 1111.
21. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186; see also Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104.
22. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
23. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104.
24. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
25. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
26. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 16.41
(5th ed. 1995).
5091999]
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Amendment, is preservative of those rights which are enumer-
ated and thus implicitly protected. 27
1. Early Recognition of the Freedom to Associate:
Expressive Association
The Court's recognition of a freedom of association initially
surfaced in situations involving organizations and their mem-
bership policies. 2 The right to "expressive association" is a
right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities
enumerated in the First Amendment. 29 Implicit in the right to
engage in the activities protected by the First Amendment is "a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends."30 The freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment would not be adequately protected from State interference
without the existence of a 'correlative freedom' to engage in a
group effort to express them.31 The protection of this implicit
right facilitates an environment within which political and cul-
tural diversity is fostered and preserved, and minority points of
view are not suppressed by the majority. 32 The Court has con-
cluded, however, that the right to expressive association may be
infringed upon by the State if the State action can survive a
strict scrutiny test.33 This test requires the State to demon-
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
29. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26.
30. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 907-09, 932-33 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46
(1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
31. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; see also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coali-
tion for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981); see also NowAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 26.
32. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; see also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417
U.S. 556 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 462
(1958).
33. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; see also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Cam-
paign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982); Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wiscon-
sin, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415
U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 483; Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 486, 488 (1960).
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strate that its acts are narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest.34
In 1958 in NAACP v. Alabama,35 the Court held that the
State could not compel the NAACP to disclose its membership
lists.36 Due to the cultural climate at the time, the disclosure of
this kind of information could have impeded the members' abil-
ity to "engage in lawful association in support of their common
beliefs." 37 The Court emphasized that "[it] is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of 'liberty' assured by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces the First Amendment."38
2. The 1980s: Intimate Association Is Named
Although Justice Douglas, in his Hymn to Marriage in
Griswold v. Connecticut 39 in 1965, referred to marriage as an
association, "intimate association" was not named until 1980.40
The right to intimate association, as an offshoot of the more
general freedom of association, was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.41 In that
case, the Court held that the application of a state human
rights law which compelled the Jaycees to accept women did not
abridge male members' freedom of intimate or expressive asso-
ciation. 42 With respect to intimate association, the Supreme
34. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3. The Court in Roberts em-
phasized that the compelling state interest must be unrelated to the suppression of
ideas. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
35. 357 U.S. 462 (1958).
36. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 465.
37. Id. at 462.
38. Id.
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. See Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1980). Karst articulated four key components of intimate association: 1) the op-
portunity to enjoy the society of other people, 2) caring and commitment, 3) inti-
macy, and 4) self-identification. See id. at 647. Karst also stated that this concept
of intimate association is not only applicable to traditional relationships like mar-
riage, but also to nontraditional relationships, including unmarried couples, ille-
gitimate children, and gay and lesbian relationships. See id. at 673. According to
Karst, intimate association is derived from a combination of the First Amendment
and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 625.
41. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
42. See id. at 626.
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Court concluded that "choices to enter into and maintain cer-
tain intimate human relationships must be secured against un-
due intrusion by the State because of the role of such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is
central to our constitutional scheme."43
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that certain
highly personal relationships must be given protection from
State interference." Intimate association is protected by the
Due Process Clause and is an implicit component of the Bill of
Rights guarantees. 45 The Court has established objective pa-
rameters for determining where each relationship falls on a
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of per-
sonal attachments.4 6 Great importance has been attached to
those kinds of relationships which "have played a critical role in
the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs." 47 These bonds are said
to "foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the indi-
vidual and the power of the State."48 The underlying notion
which drives the protection of these types of relationships is
that defining one's identity is critical to the concept of liberty.49
43. Id. at 618.
44. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
45. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 16.41. Intimate association is
also closely related to the right to privacy guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
See Scott D. Weiner, Same-Sex Intimate and Expressive Association: The Pickering
Balancing Test or Strict Scrutiny?, HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 651 (1996). Intimate
association and privacy have been treated as equivalent by some courts. See, e.g.,
Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1499-500 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
46. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
47. Id. at 619.
48. Id. at 619; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482-85 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Gilmore v.
City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431
U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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Those personal affiliations which have been constitution-
ally protected generally have been limited to the following: the
creation of a family, or marriage,50 childbirth,51 the raising and
education of children,52 and cohabitation with one's relatives.5 3
These types of associations have been characterized as, "rela-
tively small, highly selective, and in [their] nature, almost ex-
clusive because they concern highly personal relationships."5 4
In Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club,55 the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects those
relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose
"deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few
other individuals with whom one shares not only a special com-
munity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinc-
tively personal aspects of one's life."5 6 Conversely, associations
lacking these qualities, such as large commercial enterprises,
are not afforded constitutional protection.57 For example, in
that case, the Court found that the California civil rights stat-
ute did not violate the First Amendment by requiring California
Rotary Clubs to admit women to membership because the appli-
cation of the statute to the Clubs did not interfere unduly with
the members' freedom of association.58 The Court explained
that the relationship among the Club members was not the
kind of intimate or private relation that warranted constitu-
tional protection.5 9
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Treatment of Associational Rights
The Eleventh Circuit has taken "an expansive view of the
right of intimate association under the First Amendment, pro-
50. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
51. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
52. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
53. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 434 U.S. 494 (1972).
54. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 16.41 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at
619).
55. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
56. Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 545 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 619-20); see also Cummings v. DeKalb, 24 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 1994)
(stating that both intimate and expressive association are First Amendment
rights).
57. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
58. See Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 547.
59. See id. at 546.
1999] 513
7
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:507
tecting even dating relationships." 60 Before the Roberts decision
in 1984, most of the association cases before the Eleventh Cir-
cuit involved the protection of an individual from being found
"guilty" solely based on his personal connection to criminals or
others.61 After the Roberts court acknowledged intimate associ-
ation as a legal right,62 the Eleventh Circuit decided its leading
case regarding intimate association.63 In McCabe v. Sharrett,
the secretary of a local police chief was demoted because she
married a local police officer and there were subsequent con-
cerns about her loyalty and ability to maintain the office's confi-
dentiality.64 The court there acknowledged that the action
taken against McCabe was related to her constitutionally pro-
tected intimate association with her husband. 65 However, after
balancing McCabe's interests against the interests of her em-
ployer, the Eleventh Circuit held that the demotion decision
was proper.66
60. Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 1995) (Kravitch, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hatcher v. Board of Educ., 809
F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1544
(11th Cir. 1984), rehearing en banc granted, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996), rehear-
ing vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996).
61. See, e.g., Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1981) (Wilson I), appeal
after remand, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984) (Wilson II) (holding that dating rela-
tionship with convicted felon was protected by First Amendment freedom of associ-
ation); Tyson v. New York Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(emphasizing that eviction of parents based on criminal activities of their nonresi-
dent adult children is a violation of parents' freedom of association).
62. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
63. See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994).
64. See id. at 1560.
65. See id. at 1563. The court in McCabe did not explicitly state the constitu-
tional origin of this right. However, later cases involving public employment ac-
knowledged intimate association as a First Amendment right. See, e.g., Cummings
v. DeKalb County, 24 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 1994); Parks v. City of Warner
Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 615 (11th Cir. 1995).
66. See McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1570-71. The court there employed the Pickering
balancing test which includes an assumption that when the state acts as an em-
ployer it has a unique interest in providing quality services to the public which
must be taken into consideration. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
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C. Homosexual Rights and the Supreme Court
1. There's Nothing Fundamental About Bowers v.
Hardwick 67
In 1982, Hardwick was charged with violating a Georgia
statute criminalizing consensual sodomy for engaging in sod-
omy with another adult male in the bedroom of Hardwick's
home.68 In 1986, when Attorney General Bowers' case reached
the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that no
fundamental right exists for consenting adults to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy. 69 The Court there stated that precedent
cases only conferred a right to privacy where there was a clear
connection to family, marriage or procreation.70 The privacy
and intimate association rights asserted by Hardwick were de-
nied by the Court on the grounds that "the proposition that any
kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is con-
stitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupport-
able. 7 1
In identifying the nature of those rights which do qualify
for heightened judicial protection, the Court stated that the cat-
egory includes those fundamental liberties that are "'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor jus-
tice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' '"72 The Court further
noted that the liberty must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."73 It was further emphasized that the
67. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
68. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187. Georgia's anti-sodomy statute reads in perti-
nent part as follows:
"A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another."
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984).
69. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204.
70. See id. at 190 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977)); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
72. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
73. Id; see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 216 (1990) (hold-
ing that "personal bonds" formed through the use of a motel room for less than 10
1999] 515
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proscriptions against sodomy have "ancient roots."74  Until
1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy. 75 Today, 24 states and the
District of Columbia have statutes making consensual sodomy a
criminal act.76 The Court relied on this historical context in ex-
pounding that "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."77
2. Not a Word About Bowers v. Hardwick: 78 Equal
Protection and Homosexual Rights in Romer v.
Evans79
In the tradition of the language of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws,"80 Justice Kennedy wrote
hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of
the Nation). In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977), the Supreme Court held that "the liberty interest in fam-
ily privacy has its source,... in intrinsic human rights, as they have been under-
stood in 'this Nation's history and traditions.'" In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977), the Supreme Court held that "[its] decisions establish
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the insti-
tution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural." See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
74. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
75. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939). In 1961,
Illinois adopted the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code which decriminal-
ized private sexual conduct between consenting adults. Criminal Code of 1961,
§§ 11-2, 11-3, 1961 Ill. Laws, pp. 1985, 2006 (codified as amended at Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 38, T 11-2, 11-3 (1983) (repealed 1984)).
76. See Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homo-
sexual Activity, 40 U. MiMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986).
77. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. The dissent of Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, however, stated that the "right to be let alone" is one of the
most comprehensive of rights, and one most valued by "civilized men." Id. at 199
(citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)). It was further opined that "only the most willful blindness could obscure the
fact that sexual intimacy is 'a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, cen-
tral to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personal-
ity.'" Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
63 (1973); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
78. 478 U.S. 186.
79. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The majority opinion in Romer does not make any
mention of the Bowers decision, despite the fact that it was the last case before
Romer regarding homosexual rights which the Supreme Court had heard.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
516
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that "the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens."' 8' Statutory classifications of citizens must
meet at least a minimum rationality requirement, namely that
the classification be rationally related to the purpose of the leg-
islation.8 2 The Court has, however, developed two other levels
of scrutiny for assessing the validity of certain statutory classifi-
cations. In the late 1960s, the Warren Court developed a "new"
equal protection or "strict scrutiny" standard.8 3 The Court de-
termined that either the presence of a "suspect" classification,
or an impact on fundamental rights, would require a statute to
withstand a strict scrutiny analysis in order to be upheld as
constitutional.8 4 Historically, a common "suspect" classification
has been one based on race.85 Sex, alienage and illegitimacy
have also been subject to a heightened, or "intermediate" scru-
tiny.86 As a middle ground between the rational basis and strict
scrutiny standards, the Court espoused this "intermediate"
level of review to be applied in areas such as sex discrimination
and gender classifications. 87 Under this test, the statutory clas-
sification must be justified by an "important" governmental ob-
jective and must be "substantially related" to the achievement
of those objectives.88
81. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1622, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996) (citing
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)).
82. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
628 (13th ed. 1997).
83. See id. at 630. This is the highest level of scrutiny which the court can
employ when faced with an Equal Protection challenge. It requires that the state
action be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. See id.
84. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3 (stating "[E]qual protection
analysis demands strict scrutiny.., of old classifications that penalize rights al-
ready established as fundamental for reasons unrelated to equality . . ").
85. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that classifi-
cations based on race are 'suspect' and must be held to the most rigid scrutiny and
would be upheld only if they were based on 'public necessity').
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating under an
intermediate scrutiny standard a statutory provision that entitled women workers
to less benefits for their families than their male counterparts); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that Texas statute which withheld from local school dis-
tricts any state funds for children who were not 'legally admitted' and which au-
thorized local schools to deny enrollment to such children violated Equal
Protection).
1999] 517
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In Romer v. Evans, the Court held that an Amendment to
the Colorado Constitution, which prohibited all legislative, ex-
ecutive or judicial action designed to protect homosexuals, lesbi-
ans and bisexuals as a class, was violative of Equal Protection.8 9
The Amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdi-
visions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or en-
force any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or enti-
tle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimina-
tion. This section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-
executing.90
The Court found that the Amendment failed even a rational ba-
sis test and "seem[ed] inexplicable by anything but animus to-
ward the class that it affects; it lack[ed] a rational relationship
to legitimate state interests."91 Additionally, the Court found it
unacceptable that the Amendment "nullifie[d] specific legal pro-
tections for this targeted class in all transactions in housing,
the sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services,
private education, and employment."92
The State's rationale for the Amendment was that it "puts
gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons...
[it] does no more than deny homosexuals special rights."93 The
Court responded by acknowledging that the Amendment was
both too narrow and too broad in that it identified persons by a
single trait and then denied them equal protection altogether.94
The Court found that the language of the Amendment, "de-
89. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
90. Colo. Const., Art. II § 30b.
91. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975) ("No matter how uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of
this court, we have held that 'mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitu-
tionally justify the deprivation of a person's . . . liberty."); see also Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United States Dept. of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
92. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
93. Id. at 1624.
94. See id. at 1628.
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prive[d] gays and lesbians even of the protection of the general
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in gov-
ernmental and private settings."95 The Amendment was de-
clared a "status-based enactment" and a "classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake, something [equal protec-
tion] does not permit" for "'class legislation... [is] obnoxious to
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment ... "'96
D. Homosexual Rights in Lower Courts
1. Military Service
Inferences which are often made from homosexual status to
illegal sexual conduct are particularly prevalent in litigation re-
garding military service. Actions brought by gay plaintiffs in
this area often reflect concerns expressed by the dissenting jus-
tices in Bowers, for "litigation over the expulsion of lesbians and
gays from the armed services has a particularly close nexus to
Bowers, as both concern the relationship between gay sexual
acts and gay identities."97 Despite the fact that the United
States Code now states that gays may serve in the military, gay
litigants have faced an uphill battle.98 Many courts have fol-
lowed the lead of the Supreme Court in Bowers, and equated
"gayness" with sodomy. 99 In 1989, the Seventh Circuit held
that even though the record showed no evidence that the plain-
tiff had engaged in criminal sexual conduct "[pilaintifi's lesbian
acknowledgment, if not an admission of practice, at least can
rationally and reasonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a
desire and propensity to engage in homosexual conduct."100 Ad-
ditionally, in 1989, the Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal of a
gay Navy reservist based on the fact that he had not affirma-
tively claimed to be celibate and that he once went to an officer's
club with another enlisted gay man. 1 1
95. Id. at 1626.
96. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
97. Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transforma-
tion in Judicial Argument over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 893, 911.
98. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1996).
99. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (uphold-
ing the Army Reserve's decision not to allow an openly lesbian reservist to
reenlist).
100. Id.
101. See Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1074 n.6 (Fed. Cir.).
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Gay servicepeople have been given the opportunity to take
advantage of a "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy within which gays
are permitted to serve in the military if they can rebut the pre-
sumption that they would engage in homosexual acts.10 2 In
Cammermeyer v. Aspin,0 3 a senior officer and nurse in the
United States Army was discharged because she admitted that
she was gay, but was reinstated after she convinced the court
that a distinction existed between her lesbianism and the crimi-
nal acts of sodomy. 0 4 Despite some such 'victories,' many
courts have rejected constitutional challenges to military bans
on homosexual conduct. 05
2. Same-Sex Marriage: The Hawaiian Anomaly
Gay litigants in Hawaii broke new ground when the Hawaii
Supreme Court vacated a lower court decision which dismissed
an action brought by four lesbians and two gay men seeking de-
claratory judgment that Hawaii's refusal to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples violated their right to privacy and
Equal Protection under the Hawaii Constitution. 0 6 The court
in Baehr v. Lewin 0 7 analogized Hawaii's prohibition of same-
sex marriage to Virginia's prohibition of miscegenation, which
the Court in Loving v. Virginia held to be unconstitutional in
1967.108 The court in Baehr also found that the notion that
same-sex marriage was not constitutionally protected because it
is "intrinsically unnatural" was "tautological and circular."0 9
The court reasoned that "constitutional law may mandate, like
it or not, that customs change with an evolving social order.""0
102. See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 920 (W.D. Wash. 1994);
see also Able v. United States, 88 F. 3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that seven
servicepeople have successfully rebutted the presumption that homosexual status
and sodomy are inseparable).
103. 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
104. See Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 918.
105. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
discharge proceedings are not unconstitutional if subsequent to admission of ho-
mosexual status).
106. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. Haw. 1993).
107. 852 P.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. Haw. 1993).
108. See id. at 61-62. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
109. See id. at 63.
110. Id.
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In response to this controversial decision, Congress passed
the Defense of Marriage Act."' This Act allows states to refuse
to recognize same-sex marriages legitimized in other states.1 2
It has been argued that the Act conflicts with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution which provides
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State." 1" 3 The Baehr decision coupled with the enactment of the
Defense of Marriage Act has led to individual states taking ac-
tion to enact laws against acknowledging same-sex marriages
from other states."14
E. Government Employers and Their Employees'
Constitutional Rights
1. Standards of Review
When the state infringes upon a fundamental right its ac-
tion is subject to strict scrutiny and must be justified by a com-
pelling state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. 1 5 However, when the state acts as an employer that
burdens an employee's fundamental right, the Supreme Court
has set forth a balancing test which allows for consideration of
the interests of both employer and employee, and is to be ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis."16
2. The Pickering Balancing Test" 7
In Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High School,118
Pickering, a teacher in Township High School, was dismissed
111. See H.R. 3396, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
112. See id.
113. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Habib A. Balian, Til Death Do Us Part:
Granting Full Faith and Credit To Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397 (Jan.
1995).
114. See Jacobs, supra note 97 (citing Anti-Gay Backlash Continues in Ten-
nessee, Nationwide, FAMILY LAw, March 6, 1996, available at WLN 1192; Illinois
Advances Same-Sex Marriage Ban, FAMmY LAW, APRIL 29, 1996, available at WLN
3270; Elaine Herscher, When Marriage Is a Tough Proposal / Women's Suit at
Heart of Debate Over Same-Sex Unions, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 1995 at Al).
115. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 82, at 630; see, e.g., Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990).
116. See Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
117. See id.
118. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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from his position by the Board for sending a letter to a local
newspaper that was critical of the way in which the Board had
handled past proposals to raise revenue for new schools. 119 The
Supreme Court stated that "teachers may [not] constitutionally
be compelled to relinquish a First Amendment right which they
would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of
public interest in connection with operation of public schools in
which they work .... ,,120 However, the Court emphasized that
the State, as employer, has interests in regulating the speech of
its employees in order to enable it to provide quality services to
the public. 121
In order to determine whether the State, as employer, has
infringed upon its employees' constitutional rights, the Court
indicated the need for a balancing test.122 This test includes
balancing "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public concern and the interests of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees." 123 The Court set
out a general guideline for factors to be considered in such a
balancing analysis and included the following: whether there
would be a problem maintaining harmony among co-workers,
and whether the employment relationships are intimate such
that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their
proper functioning.124 The weight afforded to the State's inter-
119. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The Pickering balancing test also has
been applied in cases where adverse employment decisions have been made on
account of the employee's exercise of other constitutionally protected rights. See,
e.g., Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. and Orphange, 809 F.2d 1546, 1559 (11th Cir.
1987) (applying Pickering test to expressive association claim); Stough v. Cren-
shaw Bd. of Educ., 744 F.2d 1479, 1480-82 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying Pickering test
to parents' constitutional right to control the education of their children); Brown v.
Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 658-59 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1042 (1996) (applying test to free exercise of religion claim); Sullivan v. Meade
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 530 F.2d 799, 804-06 (8th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that
test would apply to association and substantive due process claim).
124. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.
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ests depends on the reasonableness of the State's predictions in
taking particular action.125
III. Shahar v. Bowers126
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff Robin Joy Shahar, spent the summer of 1990,
while a law student, as a clerk with the Office of the Attorney
General of the State of Georgia. 127 In September of that year
Attorney General Michael J. Bowers offered Shahar the position
of Staff Attorney to commence upon her graduation from law
school.128 Shahar accepted the Attorney General's offer and was
to begin work in September of 1991.129
During the summer of 1990, Shahar began to make plans
for a religious ceremony, or "wedding," in which she would be
"married" to another woman by a rabbi from the Reconstruc-
tionist Movement of Judaism. 130 This religious movement ac-
knowledges and accepts same-sex marriages. 131 Both Shahar
and her partner had practiced this religion for many years. 132
Shahar invited two department employees from the Attorney
General's Office to the "wedding."133 Additionally, in November
of 1990, Shahar filled out the required application for a Staff
Attorney where she indicated that her status was "engaged"
125. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677 (1994) (stating that "it may be
unreasonable, for example, for the employer to come to a conclusion based on no
evidence at all ... [and] likewise, it may be unreasonable for an employer to act
based on extremely weak evidence when strong evidence is clearly available.");
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984) (noting that catering to private prejudice is not a legitimate
government interest); see also Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding
that government employer's interest in staffing its offices with persons the em-
ployer trusts is given great weight); Board of Comm'rs, Waubansee Cty. v.
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 135 L. Ed. 2d 843 (1996) (stating that government needs
to be free to terminate employees to improve efficiency, efficacy, and responsive-
ness of services to the public).
126. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
127. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1110.
131. See id.
132. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1118.
133. See id. at 1100.
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and filled in the name of her partner, Francine M. Greenfield,
after changing "spouse's name" to "future spouse's name."
134
In June of 1991, Shahar told Deputy Attorney General Rob-
ert Coleman that she was getting married at the end of July,
changing her last name and taking a trip to Greece. 135 Senior
Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Milsteen was present at the
time and heard Coleman congratulate Shahar on her mar-
riage. 136 Milsteen was later informed by Susan Rutherford, an-
other attorney in the office, that Shahar was marrying a woman
and "this revelation caused a stir."3 7
Five aides to the Attorney General held several meetings to
discuss the situation. 138 The Attorney General did not attend
these meetings because he was out of the office that week.
39
Upon the Attorney General's return he was informed about the
situation and had several meetings with senior aides and law-
yers. 40 In addition, Bowers spoke to a Jewish attorney in his
office who informed him that the ceremony was to be performed
by a rabbi from New York, but that, "she was not aware of ho-
mosexual marriages being recognized in Judaism."' 4' After
these discussions and meetings with office employees, but with-
out discussing the situation with Shahar personally, Attorney
General Bowers decided to "withdraw" the employment offer
which Shahar had already accepted. 142
In July of 1991, the Attorney General sent Shahar a letter
stating the following:
[The withdrawal of your employment offer] has become necessary
in light of information which has only recently come to my atten-
tion relating to a purported marriage between you and another
woman. As chief legal officer of this state, inaction on my part
would constitute tacit approval of this purported marriage and
jeopardize the proper functioning of this office. 143
134. Id.
135. See id. at 1101.
136. See id.
137. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1121.
142. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101.
143. Id.
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The Attorney General did not have any discussion with
Shahar either before or after sending this termination letter.144
After she had a termination meeting with several office employ-
ees which the Attorney General did not attend, Shahar asked to
see the Attorney General and was told that he was unavailable
to speak with her.145
B. Procedural History
In October of 1991, Shahar filed a § 1983 action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Geor-
gia, alleging that the Attorney General's revocation of her em-
ployment offer violated her rights of intimate and expressive
association, free exercise of religion, equal protection, and sub-
stantive due process. 146 The District Court granted Attorney
General Bowers summary judgment on all claims. 14 7 Shahar
then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.148 A panel of Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals judges found for Shahar on her intimate association claim
and affirmed the judgment for Attorney General Bowers on all
other claims. 149 Attorney General Bowers then requested and
was granted an en banc hearing of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. 150
1. The District Court Decision151
The District Court did not decide whether Shahar's inti-
mate association with her lesbian partner fell within the defini-
tion of protected family relationships defined by the Supreme
Court in Roberts v. U. S. Jaycees.15 2 It did state, however, that
Shahar's association was within the "broad range of [constitu-
tionally protected] human relationships," which fall on the spec-
trum of relationships between familial relationships and
144. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1121 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
145. See id.
146. See Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (1993).
147. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101.
148. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995).
149. See id. at 1226.
150. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
151. Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F.Supp. 859 (1993).
152. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Rob-
erts, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984)).
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business associations. 153 The court employed the Pickering bal-
ancing test and found that the Attorney General's concerns re-
garding Shahar's employment outweighed Shahar's interests in
her intimate association with her partner. 54
With respect to Shahar's claim of an equal protection viola-
tion, the court found that the Attorney General's classification
of Shahar, if there was one, was not based solely on sexual ori-
entation. 155 Additionally, the court granted summary judgment
for defendant on the substantive due process claim on the
grounds that plaintiff "conceded that she had no property inter-
est in the promised employment and made no showing of depri-
vation of any liberty interest."1 56
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit: The Panel Decision157
a. Intimate Association
The Court of Appeals held that the intimate relationship
between Shahar and her partner did not involve civil, legal
marriage, "but it was inextricably entwined with Shahar's free
exercise of her religious beliefs." 58 The court vacated the sum-
mary judgment for defendant on Shahar's intimate association
claim finding that the district court erred in applying the Pick-
ering balancing test and remanded it for consideration under a
strict scrutiny test. 5 9 The court noted that the Pickering test
153. Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620). The District
Court failed to address Shahar's expressive association claim separately on the
grounds that it 'overlapped' her free exercise of religion claim, and therefore re-
quired no greater constitutional protection than her intimate association claim.
See id.
154. See id. at 1221. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). Claiming that it
found no other controlling guideline, the court also applied this balancing test to
Shahar's free exercise of religion claim, and likewise found Shahar's interest out-
weighed by the Attorney General's. See Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1221.
155. See id. The court also noted that even if Shahar had shown that the
Attorney General's classification of her was on the basis of sexual orientation, she
would have also had to show that he acted with 'impermissible intent to discrimi-
nate.' Id.
156. Id. at 1221.
157. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (1995).
158. Id. at 1224.
159. See id. at 1226. The court also remanded Shahar's expressive association
claim to the district court for consideration under a strict scrutiny analysis. See id.
at 1224.
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was developed to be applied to a free speech case, and most
often has been applied to cases involving freedom of speech or
expressive association, giving, "somewhat more deference to the
employer."160 Additionally, the court stated that, "marriage in
the conventional sense is an intimate association significant
burdens on which are subject to strict scrutiny," and that
although Shahar's marriage was not a civil, legal one, it was,
"intimate and highly personal in the sense of affection, commit-
ment, and permanency."161
In assessing Shahar's intimate association claim, the court
came to three critical conclusions regarding the nature of
Shahar's relationship. 162 First, the court found that Shahar
never asserted that her marriage was a Georgia civil mar-
riage.163 Additionally, Shahar never challenged the constitu-
tionality of Georgia's licensing statute or any other provisions of
Georgia law which speak of marriage as a ceremony, and a sta-
tus between persons of different sexes.'1 Finally, the court rec-
ognized that the intimate association asserted by Shahar was
not based on "false or sham assertions of religious beliefs." 165
b. Equal Protection
The Court of Appeals stated that although federal courts
have concluded that the equal protection claims of homosexuals
should be analyzed using a rational basis test, the facts of this
particular case require a strict scrutiny analysis.' 66 According
to the court, Shahar was classified not only as a homosexual,
160. Id. at 1224.
161. Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
162. See Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1222.
163. See id.
164. See id. Shahar's amended complaint alleged: "Plaintiff does not believe
and has at no time represented either that her religious union with her partner
carries with it any legal rights or that it constitutes a legal (civil) marriage. The
ceremony was of a purely religious nature." Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1225 (citing Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City
of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 266 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995); Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 630
(10th Cir. 1992); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Pdaula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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but as a homosexual engaging in the exercise of her religious
faith. 167
3. Shahar v. Bowers: The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit: En Banc168
a. The Majority Opinion
The court declined to decide whether a constitutionally pro-
tected right exists for two women to be "married" in the sense
that Shahar and her partner are married, 169 because the court
claimed that even a favorable decision for Shahar on the consti-
tutional issue presented would entitle her to no relief in this
case.170 Instead, the court assumed, arguendo, that Shahar had
the rights she claimed, and still held that the Attorney Gen-
eral's act was constitutional.'17 The court began its analysis by
stressing that the rights to intimate and expressive association
are not absolute, 72 and that the Pickering balancing test is the
appropriate standard of review for testing for a violation of
those constitutional rights in a case such as this. 73 The rights
and duties of Georgia and its Attorney General were empha-
167. See Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1225. The court noted that "where a constitu-
tional 'fundamental right' is assaulted by the operation of [a government regula-
tion].... the enactment 'will be sustained only if [it is] suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest." Id. (citing Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 266) (quoting
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
168. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097(1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693
(1998).
169. Id. at 1100. The court stated that "powerful considerations of judicial re-
straint call upon us not to decide these constitutional issues." Id. (citing Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)) (stating
that "a fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that
courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of decid-
ing them."); Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988);
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982) (stating that
"this self-imposed limitation on the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction has an im-
portance to the institution that transcends the significance of particular
controversies.").
170. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100.
171. See id. at 1100. The court did qualify, however, that, "[it did not] decide
... that the Attorney General did or did not do the right thing when he withdrew
the pertinent employment offer ... [tihat decision is not properly [for the court] to
make." Id. at 1110.
172. See id. at 1102 (citing Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr,
U.S., 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2346, 135 L. Ed. 843 (1996)).
173. See id. at 17; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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sized, particularly in light of the fact that the state in this case
was acting as an employer. 174
1. Shahar's Argument for Strict Scrutiny, Court's
Conclusions
Shahar argued that the court should rely on Dike v. School
Bd.,'7 5 and should review the case under strict scrutiny.176
There, the court held that a school district's refusal to allow a
teacher to breastfeed her child on her lunch hour should be held
to a strict scrutiny standard. 177 The Shahar court overruled
Dike to the extent that it might be interpreted as requiring
strict scrutiny review of a government employee's freedom of as-
sociation claim against a government-employer. 178 To support
this ruling, the court relied on Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee
Cty. v. Umbehr, 179 where the Court employed the Pickering bal-
ancing test and held that government contractors are protected
from termination or failure to renew their contracts for exercis-
ing their free speech rights. 8 0 Rejecting Shahar's argument for
strict scrutiny application, the court concluded that the Picker-
ing balancing test should be employed.''
In finding that the Attorney General's interests outweighed
Shahar's under the balancing test, the court relied on a line of
cases which held that "government employees who have access
to their employer's confidences or who act as spokesperson for
their employers, as well as those employes with some policy-
174. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1102. The court acknowledged that the govern-
ment's role as employer is different from its role as sovereign, and must be re-
viewed accordingly. See id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994)
(stating that "the key to First Amendment analysis of government employment
decisions... is this: The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively
and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when
its acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.").
175. 650 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
176. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (citing Dike, 650 F.2d at 787). Shahar also
asked that the court look to the case of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which
held that miscegenation is not a legitimate governmental interest and discussed
public perception about miscegenation, but the court concluded that "the analogy
[was] not helpful to decide this case." Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105.
177. See Dike, 650 F.2d at 787.
178. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101.
179. 116 S. Ct. 2342, 135 L Ed. 843 (1996).
180. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1103 (citing Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2342).
181. See id.
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making role, are in a special class of employees and might sel-
dom prevail under the First Amendment."8 2 Among the noted
responsibilities of a Staff Attorney for the Attorney General's
office were "doing, or be[ing] ready to do important things,
which require the capacity to exercise good sense and discretion
(as the Attorney General . . . defines those qualities): advise
about policy; have access to confidential information; speak,
write on behalf of the Attorney General and for the State."18 3
The court concluded that the Attorney General could limit the
lawyers on his personal staff to those whom he trusted, and
found no federal appellate decision which allowed a
"subordinate" prosecutor to keep his job over the chief lawyer's
objection. 8 4 Therefore, in balancing the parties' interests, the
court noted that because the chief attorney must have faith and
confidence in his legal staff, he "must be given greater deference
in his employment decisions than might be appropriate in other
areas of government."18 5
When analyzing the Attorney General's rationale for revok-
ing Shahar's employment offer, the court primarily focused on
the public perception of the Attorney General's office and on his
concerns for the inner workings of his department. 8 6 The court
discussed the statutory context presented by Georgia's sodomy
laws 87 and found that the Attorney General believed that
182. Id. (citing Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir. 1993); Sims v. Metro-
politan Dade Cty., 972 F.2d 1230, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 1992); Kinsey v. Salado In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
183. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104.
184. See id. at 1103 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Livas v.
Petka 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1983). See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-15-30 (1998") (provid-
ing that all subordinate attorneys of the Attorney General's office "shall be ap-
pointed by the Attorney General for such periods of time as he deems advisable"
and "may be removed by the Attorney General."). Shahar, 114 F.3d at n.5. The
court also noted that the Attorney General lost confidence in Shahar's ability to
make good judgments due to the fact that she engaged in this controversial 'mar-
riage' and that she, "seemingly did not appreciate the importance of appearances
and the need to avoid bringing 'controversy' to the Department." Id. at 1105.
185. Id. at 1104 (citing Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 143 (7th Cir. 1996);
Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1991); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 519 n. 13 (1980)).
186. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104.
187. See id. at 1105 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding
that criminal prosecution of consensual homosexual sodomy does not violate sub-
stantive due process). The court also stated that although the fact that Shahar and
her partner hold themselves out to be lesbians does not prove beyond a reasonable
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within that context, Shahar's acts had a "realistic likelihood" to
1) affect the department's credibility; 2) interfere with the de-
partment's ability to handle controversial matters, such as
claims to same-sex marriage licenses; 3) interfere with Geor-
gia's ability to enforce its laws against homosexual sodomy; and
4) create other difficulties within the department which would
be likely to harm the public perception of the office.188 The court
emphasized the potential implications on public perception
based on the idea that "some reasonable persons may suspect
that having a Staff Attorney who is part of a same-sex 'mar-
riage' is the same thing as having a Staff Attorney who violates
the State's law against homosexual sodomy."189 The court found
the Attorney General's worries and views to be within the range
of reasonable assessments of the facts in this case, 190 and con-
cluded that the fact that the Attorney General never met with
Shahar personally was "inconsequential."91
2. Additional Arguments Asserted by Shahar
In addition to requesting that the court apply a strict scru-
tiny standard of review, Shahar also argued that the Attorney
General impermissibly discriminated against her by using the
perceived public reaction to her "marriage" to justify his deci-
sion to terminate her.192 She relied on Romer v. Evans 93 to sup-
doubt that either of them has engaged in sodomy, "when two people say of them-
selves that they are 'married' to each other, it is reasonable for others to think
those two people engage in marital relations." The court further concluded that
"sodomy is an act basic to homosexuality." Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105.
188. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104 (citing Board of Comm'rs, Waubansee Cty.
v. Umbehr, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 2342, 135 L. Ed.2d 843 (1996) (stating "The govern-
ment needs to be free to terminate both employees and contractors ... to improve
the efficiency, efficacy and responsiveness of service to the public . .
189. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105.
190. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110. The court concluded that statutory devel-
opments were reflective of the fact that "Georgia's people, in general, are set
against equating in some way a relationship between persons of the same sex with
traditional marriage." Id. at n.24 (citing O.C.G.A §7) (defining marriage as con-
sisting of a man and a woman) and U.S.C. § 1738(c) (giving states the power to
refuse to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states)).
191. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661(1994) (holding that Pickering balance only requires facts to be weighed on gov-
ernment's side to be reasonable view of facts or reasonable predictions).
192. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1107.
193. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed.2d 855 (1996).
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port her argument.194 The court distinguished the instant case
from Romer stating that "Romer is about people's condition; this
case is about a person's conduct ... and, Romer is no employ-
ment case."1 95 In rejecting Shahar's argument the court also re-
lied on McCullen v. Carson,96 where the court held that a
sheriff's clerical employee's First Amendment interest in an off-
duty statement that he was employed by the sheriffs office and
also was a recruiter for the Ku Klux Klan was outweighed by
the sheriffs interest in community perception and credibility. 97
As the court found in the McCullen case, the court in Shahar
stated that the Attorney General did not have to wait for events
to unfold, but could make judgments and "take steps to protect
the public from confusion about his stand and the Law Depart-
ment's stand on controversial matters, such as same-sex
marriage."198
Shahar also asked the court to consider the fact that she
affirmatively disavowed a right to benefits from the Department
based on her marriage. 99 The court found that this fact did not
"count for much in the balance," for Shahar was "merely ac-
knowledging what is undisputed, that Georgia law does not and
has not recognized homosexual marriage."20 0 Additionally, the
court noted that Shahar certainly held herself out as married
and that this was "not done secretly, but openly."201
Shahar further argued that the "weakness," or unreasona-
bleness of the Attorney General's 'predictions' should lessen the
weight they are given in the balancing.20 2 The court found,
however, that Shahar overstated the Attorney General's eviden-
tiary burden, and concluded that the close working relation-
194. See id.
195. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110. The court also noted that in deciding Romer,
the Court did not overrule, disapprove of, or even mention Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986). See id.
196. 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985).
197. See McCullen, 754 F.2d at 940.
198. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1109.
199. See id. at 1118 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
200. Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1106-07.
201. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1107. The court also referred to the fact that both
women had legally changed their family name to Shahar, that they sought and
received a married rate on their insurance and that they jointly own the house in
which they live. See id.
202. See id.
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ships involved in an Attorney General's office call for "a wide
degree of deference to the employer's judgment."20 3 Because he
was found to have acted to prevent the "doubt and uncertainty
of purpose [which can] undo an office," the court found that "he
[was] not unreasonable to guard against [this] potentiality."20 4
Additionally, the court rejected Shahar's argument that the
Pickering test requires evidence of potential interference with
her particularized duties.205
b. The Dissents20 6
1. Reasonableness Requirements Not Met
The dissenting judges found that 1) Shahar's association
qualifies as a constitutionally protected intimate association
and, therefore must be given great weight in the balancing
analysis; 2) the Pickering balancing test was appropriate; 3) the
Attorney General's interests and actions must be assessed in
light of their reasonableness or lack thereof; and that 4)
Shahar's interests outweighed the Attorney General's. 20 7 A pri-
mary focus of each of the dissenting opinions in this case is the
notion that the Attorney General did not meet constitutional re-
quirements of reasonableness. 208 The Attorney General based
his decision to terminate Shahar's employment offer based on
the assertion that Shahar "invoked the civil and legal status of
being married to another woman" and on a series of inferences
flowing therefrom. 20 9 The dissenting judges found the Attorney
General's conclusions to be unsupported. 210
First, the Attorney General drew an inference from
Shahar's status as a lesbian and concluded that the public
would be hostile to her participation in a same-sex marriage
and might view her employment by his Department as inconsis-
203. Id. (citing Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983)).
204. Id. at 1108.
205. See id.
206. See Shahar, 114 F.3d. at 1117. Four separate dissenting opinions were
written. See id. (Godbold, J., Kravitch, J., Birch, J., Barkett, J., dissenting).
207. See id. at 1123.
208. See id. at 1124.
209. Id. at 1120.
210. See id. at 1119.
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tent with Georgia law. 211 In his brief, Bowers argued that "pub-
lic perception is that 'the natural consequence of a marriage is
some sort of sexual conduct ... and if it's homosexual, it would
have to be sodomy."' 212 The dissenting judges found that this
statement "[was] based not on anything set forth in the record
but rather on public stereotyping and animosity toward homo-
sexuals."213 Particularly, they found that the government may
not transform private biases into legitimate state interests,214
and that "[ilf the public's perception is borne of no more than
unsupported assumptions and stereotypes, it is irrational and
cannot serve as the basis of legitimate government action."215
Bowers also asserted an interest in terminating Shahar's
offer due to concern for the inner workings of his office. 216 His
two primary arguments in support of his predictions in this re-
gard were that 1) Shahar's conduct might undermine morale be-
cause some might view her conduct as a political statement
inconsistent with Georgia's sodomy laws; and that 2) he is justi-
fied in assuming that Shahar would commit sodomy, and that
she necessarily would have a conflict of interest with respect to
enforcing laws regarding sodomy or same-sex marriages. 217
Judge Kravitch emphasized, however, that Shahar never
claimed that she was legally married, and in fact actually dis-
puted that idea.218 It was also pointed out that although
Shahar's relationship was not "secret," it was private, and there
was no evidence on the record of any violation or challenge of
Georgia law.219
Judge Birch stated that Bowers relied on deficient specula-
tions regarding Shahar's ability to handle certain types of cases,
and that his assumptions were unreasonable and were inconsis-
tently applied to Office employees. 220 For example, Bowers
211. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1127.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1128.
214. See id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
215. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128.
216. See id. at 1101.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 1119.
219. See id.
220. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1124. The judge also noted that there was no
showing made by the Attorney General of actual disruption in his office caused by
Shahar. See id.
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"does not assume... that an unmarried employee who is openly
dating an individual of the opposite sex has likely committed
fornication, a criminal offense in Georgia," or even that "mar-
ried employees could well have committed sodomy."221 In fact,
when a married heterosexual petitioner who had been convicted
of sodomy in Georgia moved to discover whether any of the At-
torney General's attorneys had themselves ever violated the
sodomy law, the Attorney General's Law Department moved to
strike claiming that "the personal conduct [of Department at-
torneys] is no more relevant than the personal conduct of Peti-
tioner's counsel or the Court."222
In addition to the inferences on which the Attorney General
relied, the dissenting judges also took issue with the manner in
which Bowers went about his "investigation" of the facts of the
case and his "termination" of Shahar. 223 They found particularly
unreasonable the fact that the Attorney General never spoke to
Shahar personally about the issue, and that the Attorney Gen-
eral was not present at the "termination" meeting and was "un-
available" to speak with Shahar upon her request following the
meeting.224 Judge Barkett stated that "in the absence of any
record evidence of 'weighing' or 'balancing' by the Attorney
General, the majority attempts to provide after-the-fact reasons
to support Bower's side of the scale."225
2. Pickering Balancing Focused on One Side of the Scale
The Supreme Court has held "that the First Amendment
protects those relationships, including family relationships,
that presuppose 'deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares a spe-
cial community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one's life."' 226 Judge Kravitch
found that Shahar's relationship satisfied the Supreme Court's
definition of intimate association in that it is characterized by
"relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to
221. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128.
222. Id. (Birch, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 1120.
224. See id. at 1122.
225. Id. at 1133.
226. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1122 (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (quoting Roberts at 619-20)).
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begin and maintain an affiliation, and seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship."227 Because he found that
Shahar's relationship falls on the familial end of the continuum
of human relationships, he concluded that it should be given
great weight in the balancing test.228 While the en banc major-
ity recognized that as the chief law enforcement officer in Geor-
gia, Bowers' legitimate interests in the functioning of his staff
carry special weight, Judge Kravitch found that the majority
inappropriately granted almost absolute deference to Bowers'
interests and actions, 229 and stated that the majority "employed
a balancing test in name only."230
IV. Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick231 has
established a framework within which lower courts, like the
court in Shahar, have inferred illegal sexual conduct from ho-
mosexual status, and thus have denied homosexuals' rights.232
Courts are relying on status-based classifications and punish-
ments by employing some version of the following logic:
- In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court said that it is consti-
tutional for states to make consensual sodomy illegal.233
- "Sodomy is an act basic to homosexuality."234
- Therefore, homosexuals engage in illegal conduct and violate
sodomy laws.
The acceptance of such logic makes homosexual status "punish-
able." Nowhere in Bowers v. Hardwick does the Supreme Court
reach such a holding. 235
227. Id. (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620).
228. See id. at 1104.
229. See id. at 1124 (citing Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir. 1993)
(stating that "whether a governmental employer has improperly infringed on an
employee's First Amendment rights turns on the specific facts of the particular
case: a 'case-by-case' analysis is required.") (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1124 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
231. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
232. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104.
233. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
234. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Watkins v. United States Army,
847 F.2d 1329, 1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated by 875 F.2d
699 (1989)).
235. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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In failing to acknowledge that Shahar's relationship fits
squarely within the Supreme Court's definition of intimate as-
sociation, the Shahar court relied on public prejudice rather
than on legal precedent. After assuming, arguendo only, that
Shahar had a constitutionally protected right to intimate asso-
ciation, the court claimed to employ the Pickering balancing test
to analyze the competing interests of the parties.236 In fact,
however, very little balancing was done. The Attorney Gen-
eral's interests were considered almost exclusively and his deci-
sions were given near absolute deference. 237
A. Traditions of Oppression
1. A Decade Later the Paralyzing Effects of Bowers v.
Hardwick Are Still Felt238
While the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick held that
laws prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy between
adults are constitutional, the Court has never held that simply
being homosexual is illegal. 239 Despite this critical distinction
between status and conduct, lower courts have invoked Bowers
to support holdings which rely upon a direct inference from ho-
mosexual status to sodomy.240 This inference or assumption
creates a slippery slope for denial of homosexuals' rights be-
cause it operates as if being homosexual were in some way crim-
inal or punishable. Such an unreasonable leap in legal logic
was made by the court in Shahar.241
The "traditions" relied on by the Attorney General and the
court in Shahar are not those referred to in Roberts, but are
traditions of prejudice and unconstitutional discrimination. 242
The Shahar court has added to and thus perpetuated a tradi-
tion in which homosexuals are identified and punished based
solely on their perceived sexual activity. The court there relied
on the notion that "sodomy is an act basic to homosexuality," to
justify the Attorney General's unreasonable punishment of
236. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1103.
237. See id.
238. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
239. See id. at 196.
240. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1097.
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Shahar for being gay.243 The court used the power of inference
to achieve the effect of making homosexual status unacceptable:
if homosexuals engage in sodomy, and sodomy is illegal, then
being homosexual is "punishable." Because such a status-based
conclusion or classification is unacceptable, courts like the
Shahar court are hiding behind the public controversy about
homosexual issues to oppress homosexuals as a class.2" The
Attorney General's decision was found reasonable "against this
background of ongoing controversy" about "homosexual sodomy,
homosexual marriages and other related issues."245 According
to this logic, no openly gay individual can be employed by the
Attorney General. By grounding his argument in public percep-
tion, the Attorney General, and in turn the court, impermissibly
give effect to public prejudice.
The Supreme Court's 1986 opinion established a legal
framework within which courts can hide homophobia. 246 As dis-
cussed above, the Bowers court not only held that is there no
fundamental right to engage in sodomy, but also that the notion
that "any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting
adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
unsupportable."247 The court there based much of its opinion on
its perception of the "history and tradition[s]" of our nation. 248
The court emphasized that fundamental rights are only those
which are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were
sacrificed." 249
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the "abil-
ity independently to define one's identity is central to any con-
cept of liberty,"250 the Bowers Court failed to recognize that this
self-definition cannot truly occur in a vacuum. 251 The Bowers
Court failed to leave room for all individuals to define and ex-
243. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Watkins v. United States Army,
847 F.2d 1329, 1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated by 875 F.2d
699 (1989).
244. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
245. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105.
246. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
247. Id. at 191.
248. Id. at 192.
249. Id. at 191-92 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
250. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619).
251. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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press themselves through their intimate relationships. The
Court held that state laws criminalizing consensual sodomy are
constitutional due to the states' police power, despite the fact
that "[a way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes
with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned be-
cause it is different."25 2
The fact that the Attorney General gave effect to public
prejudice is revealed as one compares the disparate treatment
of heterosexuals and homosexuals under the same law. As op-
posed to heterosexuals, homosexuals are defined by their poten-
tial participation in acts of sodomy, rather than by the
emotional attachments which may define the core of their rela-
tionships. 25 3 No consideration is given to the fact that Georgia's
anti-sodomy statute does not refer specifically to homosexual
sodomy, but to sodomy in general. 25 4 The question remains as
to whether the Attorney General could terminate a heterosex-
ual employee due to the possibility or likelihood that he or she
might engage in an "illegal" sexual activity, namely sex "out of
wedlock" or heterosexual oral or anal sex. It is difficult to imag-
ine the court giving the same deference to the Attorney General
in such a case. In Shahar, however, the court does make such a
leap and gives effect to public prejudices. This "Bowers phe-
nomenon," when courts automatically equate homosexual sta-
tus with illegal sexual conduct, results in the law being carried
out as if being homosexual were illegal. This distortion is
couched in the language of tradition and moral teaching.
2. Loving v. Virginia: Tradition Abandoned255
In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down Vir-
ginia's anti-miscegenation statute as unconstitutional. 25 6
Although this statute was struck down on Equal Protection
grounds because it inappropriately invoked a racial classifica-
tion, there the Court overturned hundreds of years of so-called
252. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972)(Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
253. See id. at 1104.
254. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984).
255. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
256. See id. at 2.
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tradition.257 It has been argued that this kind of racial discrimi-
nation cannot be analogized to discrimination against homosex-
uals; however, the similarity in the rationale of the oppressors
in both situations is uncanny.258 In Loving, the State relied on
religious tradition and argued that "Almighty God created the
races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them
on separate continents . . . The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." 259 The State
further argued that "traditional Judeo-Christian values pro-
scribe such conduct."260
At the time that Loving was before the Court, 16 states still
had statutes which outlawed interracial marriage. 261 However,
the Court there finally acknowledged that although "the consti-
tution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate
them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly give them effect."262 Addi-
tionally, no matter how uncomfortable a certain group may
make the majority of the Court, the Court has held that, "mere
public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify
the deprivation of a person's .. . liberty."263
This traditional religious premise once used as a justifica-
tion for racism, is now being used to rationalize homophobia.
Although society has now recognized the evils of racism, the
same antiquated justifications are being used by the courts in
the realm of sexuality.264 Despite a strong dissent by Justice
Scalia, the Court in Romer v. Evans found that animosity to-
wards homosexuals as a class is not a legitimate basis for state
action.265 In light of this progression, Justice Scalia's dissenting
257. See HAWLEY & MCGREGOR, THE CRIMINAL LAW 287 (discussing that mis-
cegenation was once treated as a crime similar to sodomy).
258. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Shahar,
114 F.3d 1097.
259. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967)).
260. Id.
261. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6, n.5.
262. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
263. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); see also Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); United States Dept. of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
264. See id.
265. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1125 (citing Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629).
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opinion in Romer, which the Shahar court echoes, seems partic-
ularly ironic. 266 In that opinion he wrote: "In holding that ho-
mosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment,
the Court ... places the prestige of this institution behind the
proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible
as racial or religious bias."267 Justice Scalia articulated his view
that "opposition to homosexuals" as a class is acceptable. This
same tradition-based opposition was used 30 years ago to
counter the "evils" of interracial marriage.268
Just one year after Romer, the Shahar court, in less than a
full paragraph, discredited the analogy between Loving and
Shahar:
Shahar has tried to analogize this case to miscegenation
cases. Particularly given the obvious difference between concerns
about public perception about miscegenation-which cannot con-
stitute a legitimate governmental interest-and concerns about
public perceptions about whether a Staff Attorney in the Attorney
General's office is engaged in an ongoing violation of criminal
laws against homosexual sodomy -which laws the Supreme Court
has said are valid, we believe that the analogy is not helpful to
decide this case. 269
The clear findings in Romer, however, should have informed the
court's decision in Shahar.270 While Attorney General Bowers
and the court in Shahar attempt to distinguish between status
and conduct and claim that the Attorney General did not class-
ify Shahar based on her status as a homosexual, this distinction
is one without a difference. 271 As dissenting Justice Birch
wrote, "Bowers' action.., draws on a distinction that on its face
reaches homosexuals only and distinguishes among similarly
situated people on the basis of one trait only: that they are
homosexual." 272
266. See Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. See id.
268. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
269. Shahar, 114 F.3d 1105.
270. See id. at 1125 (Birch, J., dissenting) (citing Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1627).
271. See id. at 1097.
272. Id. at 1126 (Birch, J., dissenting).
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3. "Closeting" Encouraged
In addition to the legal difficulties faced by gay litigants, a
general climate which encourages silence and even repression
has also developed. The Clinton Administration's creation of
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy fostered an environment in
which homosexuals must bear the burden of defending them-
selves simply because of who they are. This policy "allowed"
homosexuals to remain in the military if they could meet the
burden of rebutting the presumption that they would engage in
illegal sexual acts. 273
In Shahar, the Court's language suggests a preference for
silence.27 4 Shahar's assertion that she disclaimed any benefits
bestowed by the State based on marriage was quickly dismissed
by the court as a mere statement of the obvious fact that Geor-
gia does not recognize same-sex marriages.27 5 However,
Shahar's purpose was to demonstrate that her "marriage" was
purely a religious, associational one.276 The court did not find
this point persuasive and added in an accusatory tone that
"[t]hese things were not done secretly, but openly."277
B. Shahar's Relationship Falls Within the Supreme Court
Definition of "Intimate Association"
Shahar's association with her partner consists of all of the
characteristics set forth by the Supreme Court in its definition
of "intimate association,"278 and therefore should have been
given great weight in the court's balancing analysis. Their rela-
tionship is a "highly personal relationship," and involves "deep
attachments and commitments .. .not only a special commu-
nity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of [their] li[ves] ."279 Shahar's relationship is
also "relative[ly] [small]" and involved "a high degree of selec-
tivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation .... ,,280
273. See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
274. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106.
275. Id.
276. See Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1222.
277. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1107.
278. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
279. Id. at 620.
280. Id.
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A relationship of love and mutual respect between two women
who have agreed to dedicate their lives to one another clearly is
located on the relationship continuum much nearer the most in-
timate of relationships than near attenuated commercial
relationships. 28 1
The portion of the definition set forth in Roberts which both
the court and the Attorney General incorrectly interpreted is
that which refers to "the culture and traditions of the Na-
tion."28 2 The court in Roberts stated:
certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the
culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmit-
ting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act
as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the
State ... Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such rela-
tionships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of
their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.28 3
This description of protected associations does not refer to who
has the association with whom, but to the kind of association
(i.e., highly personal versus business oriented) as characterized
above.
C. Attorney General's Interests
The Attorney General asserted that he terminated
Shahar's employment offer because she "invoked the civil and
legal status of being married" and because he believed that
Shahar's conduct had the "realistic likelihood" to 1) affect the
Department's credibility; 2) impede its ability to handle contro-
versial matters; 3) interfere with its ability to enforce Georgia's
laws against homosexual sodomy; and 4) create other difficul-
ties within the office which would affect public perception nega-
281. See id. at 619
282. Id.
283. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19 (emphasis added). See Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04(1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); see also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556,
575 (1974); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958); Poe
v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As Justice Black-
mun wrote in his dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
"only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is 'a
sensitive, key [part] of human existence, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of human personality.'"
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tively.284 The Attorney General's concerns about the proper
functioning of his Department are legitimate concerns. How-
ever, "because courts must thoroughly assess the relevance and
relative importance of asserted government interests, genera-
lized concerns that have little to do with work and more to do
with the sensibilities or prejudices of the employer or the em-
ployee's coworkers, should receive little or no weight."285
Although it has been noted that the State should be given
greater deference in its capacity as employer, as opposed to in
its capacity as sovereign "governmental interests in regulating
the controversial speech, [or conduct], of its employees are not
boundless... [r]ather, the regulations must be narrowly drawn
to serve the objectives of effective government without intrud-
ing unnecessarily into the private associations and beliefs of its
employees .-286
In Waters v. Churchill,2s 7 the Supreme Court held that
although courts must give "substantial weight to government
employers' reasonable predictions of disruption," courts should
not passively accept claims of disruption or harm suggested by
government employers.288 The Attorney General's conclusions
should have been assessed in terms of reasonableness and given
their weight in the balancing accordingly, because
the court must [not] apply the [balancing] test only to the facts as
the employer thought them to be, without considering the reason-
ableness of the employer's conclusions. Even in situations where
courts have recognized the special expertise and special needs of
certain decisionmakers, the deference to their conclusions has
never been complete ... We think employer decisionmaking will
not be unduly burdened by having courts look to the facts as the
employer reasonably found them to be. It may be unreasonable,
for example, for the employer to come to a conclusion based on no
284. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1120.
285. Scott D. Weiner, Same-Sex Intimate and Expressive Association: The
Pickering Balancing Test or Strict Scrutiny?, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 561, 581
(1996). For example, an employee who cohabitates with someone to whom she is
not married could potentially disrupt the workplace if coworkers are extremely
offended by such cohabitation and potential fornication. However, such an effect
would not be sufficient to justify adverse employment action against the employee.
See id.
286. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, at § 16.52
287. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
288. See id. at 673.
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evidence at all. Likewise, it may be unreasonable for an employer
to act based on extremely weak evidence when strong evidence is
clearly available. 28 9
The means which the Attorney General employed were unrea-
sonable and unacceptable under the circumstances. While the
Attorney General may be afforded the right to take action con-
sistent with the successful operation of his office, he must do so
reasonably.290 He must be held at least to a minimum standard
of reasonableness in his attempt to determine the facts concern-
ing an employee's speech or conduct before taking adverse em-
ployment action against that employee. 291
The Attorney General made his decision to terminate
Shahar's employment without ever speaking to her about the
issues involved. 292 He made no attempt to get first hand infor-
mation from Shahar concerning the truth of the matter in-
volved, but relied entirely on hearsay and speculated based on
the uninformed inferences he had drawn.293 First, the Attorney
General made a direct inference of conduct from status when he
stated as his justification that public perception is that the nat-
ural consequence of homosexual marriage is sodomy.294 Geor-
gia's sodomy laws refer to unlawful acts, not unlawful status,
and "once it is established that gay intimate association exists
independently of potentially criminal sexual activity, there is no
logical or constitutional basis to distinguish same-sex intimate
associations from analogous opposite-sex associations." 295 Bow-
ers' unreasonableness in this matter is further exemplified by
his inconsistent inferences. He had not expressed concern of
this kind regarding any heterosexual employees who may en-
gage in premarital sex or in sodomy, both of which are illegal in
Georgia. 296
Next, Bowers asserted that Shahar had exercised poor
judgment in making a political statement holding herself out to
289. See id. at 677.
290. See id. at 684.
291. See id. (holding that for Pickering balance, facts to be weighed on govern-
ment's side need to be reasonable view of facts or reasonable predictions).
292. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 1104.
295. Weiner, supra note 287, at 577.
296. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128.
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be legally and civilly married to another woman.297 Again,
Shahar did not make any statement claiming a legal or civil
marriage, nor did she challenge the constitutionality of any of
Georgia's laws concerning same-sex marriage, or sodomy for
that matter.298 By failing to confront Shahar regarding the in-
formation he had obtained from others regarding her, the Attor-
ney General assumed things that simply were not true.
In addition to the Attorney General's flawed inferences, he
also failed to present any evidence of actual disruption of his
office caused by Shahar or her conduct. It was not reasonable
for the Attorney General to conclude that Shahar's association
would negatively affect the department's credibility or impede
its ability to handle controversial matters. The Attorney Gen-
eral's conclusions were based upon his acknowledging and fos-
tering public prejudice. The "stir" which the Attorney General
alleges was caused in his office by the news of Shahar's "mar-
riage" is not enough to justify her termination. 299 A similar stir
would likely be caused by the staffs discovery that one of their
colleagues was engaged in the practice of an unpopular religion.
If faced with this analogy, both the Attorney General and the
Court of Appeals would likely conclude that the analogy is
faulty because there exists a right to freedom of religion, but not
to be "married" to a same-sex partner. The flaw in this line of
reasoning, however, is in its disregard for the definition of pro-
tected intimate association which the Supreme Court has set
out.300 Shahar's relationship is the kind of relationship which
warrants constitutional protection, and it is not within the
court's authority to dictate with whom she chooses to have this
kind of intimacy.301
V. Conclusion
Despite the giant leap which was taken by the Supreme
Court in Romer v. Evans, casualties of the Court's decision in
Bowers continue. The lesson learned through Loving v. Vir-
ginia will not be integrated into the legal system in the realm of
297. Weiner, supra note 287, at 582.
298. See Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1222.
299. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101.
300. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
301. See id. at 618.
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homosexual rights until antiquated notions of tradition cease to
be used as a mask to hide fear and oppression of that which is
different. The Court's definition of intimate association does
leave room for all individuals to choose to define the most im-
portant relationships in their lives, and it should be applied to
give effect to this most crucial of freedoms. Despite the fact that
homosexuality may not have been on the minds of the Framers
of our Constitution:
When we are dealing with words that are also a constituent
act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of be-
getters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had
created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a na-
tion. The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hun-
dred years ago. 30 2
Sherene D. Hannon*
302. State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
* This Casenote is dedicated to the loving memory of Henrietta Rollo, grand-
mother, teacher and friend.
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